Texas Execution

This is Richard Cobb. He is a 29 year old convicted for a murder in 2002. More then eleven years ago in East Texas he shot Kenneth Vandever with a 20-gauge shotgun killing him and also shot two women who survived. Beunka Adams was his partner in the murder who was executed last year. “KWTX reported that Adams showed that he gave the orders during the holdup and carried out the abductions. Assistant Attorney General Ellen Stewart-Klein said that Adams had “total participation in a capital murder and the moral culpability required of one sentenced to death,” the station reported” “Mr. Cobb has never disputed his involvement in the crimes, but explained that he acted out of fear of Adams, who orchestrated the crimes,” a court statement reads, according to Reuters. This is the fourth execution in Texas this year. It must be seen as not out of the ordinary, considering no press was sent to report the event. Texas has performed 496 executions since 1976, making it the leader in capital punishment.

Cobb had an interesting last moment of life, his final words. Here is where things get weird. Initially his last words were, “Life is death, death is life. I hope that someday this absurdity that humanity has come to will come to an end. Life is too short. I hope anyone that has negative energy towards me will resolve that. Life is too short to harbor feelings of hatred and anger. That’s it, warden.” But moments after being injected with the lethal chemicals he turned his head looking up at the warden and said, “Wow! That is great. That is awesome. Thank you, warden!” he then slumped his head on the pillow and was officially declared dead about fifteen minutes later.

“The drug used in Texas is pentobarbital, a barbiturate that has been withdrawn by its Danish maker, which will not sell it for use in executions.  That decision has several capital punishment states scrambling for a new supply, but the Texas Department of Criminal Justice apparently stocked up before the ban.  According to Austin’s American Statesman, the agency may have spent as much as $50,000 on execution chemicals and supplies.”

http://www.murderatthesupremecourt.com/blog

http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/27790-texas-execution-wow-exclaimed-by-inmate-during-lethal-injection/

Moncrieffe v Holder

     Moncrieffe is a Jamaican citizen who is legally here in the US and was arrested for having  1.3 grams of marijuana in his car. "He pleaded guilty under Georgia law to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The Federal Government sought to deport him, reasoning that his conviction was an aggravated felony because possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a CSA offense, 21 U. S. C. §841(a), punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, §841(b)(1)(D). An Immigration Judge ordered Moncrieffe removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Fifth Circuit denied Moncrieffe’s petition for review, rejecting his reliance on §841(b)(4), which makes marijuana distribution punishable as a misdemeanor if the offense involves a small amount for no remuneration, and holding that the felony provision, §841(b)(1)(D), provides the default punishment for his offense."
     "Under the categorical approach generally employed to determine whether a state offense is comparable to an offense listed in the INA, see, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U. S. 29–38, the noncitizen’s actual conduct is irrelevant. Instead “the state statute defining the crime of conviction” is examined to see whether it fits within the “generic” federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183. The state offense is a categorical match only if a conviction of that offense “ ‘necessarily’ involved . . . facts equating to [the] generic [federal offense].” Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13. Because this Court examines what the state conviction necessarily involved and not the facts underlying the case, it presumes that the conviction “rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts” criminalized, before determining whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense. Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133."




http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/11-702

Maryland Repeals the Death Penalty

Governor Martin O’Malley signed legislation today eliminating capital punishment in Maryland. Maryland is the 18^th state to make this decision. O’Malley has been fighting for this decision for six years. The signing was witnessed by many who are opponents of the death penalty including the first person to escape the death penalty by DNA testing, Kirk Bloodworth.

Maryland’s last execution was in 2005. However, there are currently five men condemned to the death penalty. The legislation does do not go in effect until October 1^st. The five men are not affected by this decision but O’Malley says he will consider commutation for them but in individual cases. "The notice shall be considered withdrawn and it shall be considered a notice to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under specified circumstances," according to a press release from the office of Governor Martin O'Malley.

"Maryland has effectively eliminated a policy that is proven not to work. Evidence shows that the death penalty is not a deterrent, it cannot be administered without racial bias, and it costs three times as much as life in prison without parole," the office said in a statement.
"Furthermore, there is no way to reverse a mistake if an innocent person is put to death. Working together with law enforcement partners, Maryland has driven down violent crime and homicides to three decade lows."

http://www.murderatthesupremecourt.com/blog

http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/us/maryland-death-penalty/index.html

McBurney v Young

     In this case, Mark McBurney and Robert Hurlbert were denied VFOIA (Virginia Freedom of Information Act) because they were not citizens. The VFOIA states that “all public records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the Commonwealth.” "After being denied, Petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents, the agencies which denied their VFOIA requests, with the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Petitioners argued that the VFOIA’s citizens-only provision violated their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and Hurlbert’s rights under the dormant Commerce Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment for the agencies, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Petitioners now appeal, arguing that Virginia’s citizens-only restriction violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates against out-of state economic interests both facially and in effect, and also violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it creates an inequality in access to information. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact whether a state is required allow all United States citizens to access their public records. "
     "The decision in this case will determine whether the VFOIA’s citizens-only provision is unconstitutional. If it is, all states will be required to allow equal access of public records to citizens from other states. Both sides disagree as to whether the citizens-only provision contains sufficient loopholes and exceptions to allow everyone who needs public information to obtain it and whether prohibiting the citizens-only provision would be too costly for the state."

"In an unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that Virginia’s FOIA does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause."



http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/12-17

http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/mcburney-v-young-post-decision-scotuscast

Boyer v Louisiana

     In the case, Boyer v Louisiana, Jonathan Edward Boyer was charged for murder back in 2002, and did not get a trial until 2009. The court convicted Boyer for murder and he is now arguing that the state of Louisiana violated his 6th amendment right to a speedy trial. "Specifically, Boyer alleges that five years of delay were caused entirely by Louisiana’s failure to fund his appointed, capitally-certified counsel and that this funding failure should be weighed against the state. Louisiana counters that Boyer has no constitutional right to capitally-certified counsel and that Boyer, not the State, is responsible for the delay. In resolving the question presented, the Supreme Court will determine whether a state’s failure to fund appointed, specially-qualified counsel for an indigent capital defendant should be weighed against the state for speedy trial purposes. The decision may substantially affect indigent defendants’ constitutional rights as well as state procedures for providing indigent capital defense."
     "Boyer appealed his convictions on numerous grounds, including violations of his statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights. In particular, Boyer alleged the seven-year delay between his original indictment and trial, during which the State held him in jail without bond, caused his mental deterioration and the loss of witnesses, including William Gallier, thereby prejudicing his defense. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed Boyer’s convictions and sentences, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Boyer’s petition for a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, limited to the question of whether Louisiana’s failure to fund Boyer’s capitally-certified counsel for five years should be weighed against the State for speedy trial purposes." "The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted."



http://boyavlouisi.weebly.com/



http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/11-9953

Wetzel v. Lambert

This case is discussing the issue, "Did the U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals err when it overturned a state court decision denying a death row defendant’s request for a new trial?" "in Pennsylvania back in 1984, a man named James Lambert was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of two bar patrons during a robbery of a place called Prince's Lounge in Philadelphia.  At the murder trial, one of the robbers took the stand for the prosecution and pointed the finger at Mr. Lambert along with another man, Bruce Reese, as being in cahoots with him in robbing the bar. 

Lambert is convicted, the death penalty is imposed, and the appellate process begins.  Twenty years later, Lambert's attorneys advance an argument that error has occurred because the prosecution never disclosed to the defense at trial of the "police activity sheet."  It's a big deal. 

If the state attorneys had done this, then this would fly in the face of longstanding Supreme Court precedent, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). 

What's in the "police activity sheet"?  In that sheet, a photo of a man named Lawrence Woodlock was shown to two people who were at the bar during the robbery.  Woodlock was named as a co-defendant by the state attorneys on the sheet in the Prince's Lounge robbery.  Woodlock had a record of over 13 armed robberies of bars.  Woodlock was already in custody at the time of trial on other charges.

It also had the names of two police investigators in the Lambert case and the names of those who died during the robbery with their corresponding case numbers.  Finally, it had Jackson - Lambert's buddy who took the stand against him - as stating that Woodlock had been involved in the Prince's Lounge job. 

For all these years, much less during the trial, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had not notified the defense of this document much less provided it to Lambert.  Lambert's counsel was never notified that known armed robber Larry Woodlock had ever been investigated, or had his photo shown to a Prince's Lounge witness. 

It matters because if that police activity sheet were available at trial, Lambert's attorneys could have argued that someone other than Lambert committed the armed robbery at Prince's Lounge - or that there were more people involved in the robbery that the state had been suggesting."

This case was argued on February 21st, 2012. It was also decided on February 21st, 2012. The decision was 6-3, per curiam ruling. I think this case was pretty much already decided and the facts from almost thirty years ago really could not make the initial decision of punishments any different.

http://www.reuters.com/supreme-court/2011-2012

http://www.deathpenaltyblog.com/wetzel-v-lambert-another-us-supreme-court-decision-on-the-frustrating-aedpa/

U.S. Airways v. McCutchen

     In 2007, James McCutchen was involved in a car accident that put him in the ICU. At the time, McCutchen was working for US Airways, and his health insurance from them gave him $66,866 for medical costs. In addition to that money that he received from his own insurance, he received $10,000 from the person who caused the accident and another $100,000 from the uninsured motorist coverage. After McCutchen paid his lawyers 40% contingency fees, he was left with a little under $66,000. When US Airways found out how much money McCutchen had received, they demanded to be reimbursed for the money they gave to him. So McCutchen's lawyers put $41,500 in a trust account for US Airways, but that wasn't enough so they also personally sued McCutchen for the remanding money of $25,366.
     "US Airways based their suit on Section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), which allows plan fiduciaries to sue for "appropriate equitable relief." Relying on a subrogation clause in the Plan, which required reimbursement for "any monies recovered from a third party," the trial court decided that US Airways was entitled to the entire $66,866, regardless of legal expenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that Section 502(a)(3) requires courts to provide relief in a manner that is equitable to both parties.Id.. at 679–80.  The Third Circuit determined that requiring McCutchen to reimburse the Plan fully would be inequitable because it would leave McCutchen with less than full coverage for his medical expenses while unjustly enriching US Airways, which did not exercise its subrogation rights or contribute to the cost of obtaining third-party recovery. Id. Therefore, the court ruled that McCutchen need not reimburse US Airways for the entire amount of his medical expenses and US Airways has appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse the Third Circuit’s ruling."

"The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 this week that James McCutchen, a U.S. Airways, Inc., employee does not have to pay his health plan back all of the money he recovered following a car accident."




http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/11-1285

http://ebn.benefitnews.com/news/supreme-court-issues-decision-us-airways-mccutchen-2732585-1.html